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Better read when dead?
by Neil Duxbury
The English convention opposing the citation of living authors in court withered 
away some time ago. But why did it ever evolve in the first place? In an article 
based on a chapter from his forthcoming book, Neil Duxbury looks for answers.
M academic career began at the London School if Economics in 1987. During that year, there ppeared in Public Law a book review by one of 
my colleagues in which he reported how the House of 
Lords' citation of an article by another colleague had 
prompted a circular from the LSE's Convenor drawing 
attention to the matter. This would not be the last time 
that I would learn of academic lawyers celebrating citation 
by the judiciary. And for a long time I was puzzled. English 
academic lawyers, especially when compared with their 
American counterparts, seem fairly uninterested in 
citations to one another. To be cited by a judge, however, 
is an entirely different matter. Why should English 
academic lawyers consider judicial acknowledgment of 
their work to be noteworthy?
The answer to this question is perhaps that academic 
lawyers have traditionally felt starved of attention from 
those whose acknowledgment they most crave. The value 
of academic work is something the judiciary has often 
appeared determined not to acknowledge. It seems highly 
unlikely, indeed would be near ludicrous to suggest, that 
English judges endeavoured in the past to develop a 
strategy for demoralizing legal academics. Yet that 
nebulous convention against the citation of living authors
o o
in English courts could hardly have been better designed 
to undermine the status and self-confidence of the 
academic lawyer.
CONVENTION AGAINST CITING LIVING 
AUTHORS
It seems inappropriate to refer to a distinct rule against 
the citation of living authors in court, since nothing more
o ' o
than a convention appears ever to have existed. In Ion's 
Case (1852), counsel claimed   and the presiding judges 
did not dispute   that there 'is no doubt a rule that a 
writer on law is not to be considered an authority in his 
lifetime'. Yet the footnote to this remark elaborates that 
'[t]his rule seems "more honoured in the breach than in 
the observance.'" Kekewich J endeavoured to reinforce 
the 'rule' in 1887 when, having observed that counsel's
' o
argument in the case before him had 'almost entirely 
rested upon one passage in the work of Lord Justice Fry on 
Specific Performance', he commented that:
'It is to my mind much to be regretted, and it is a regret 
which I believe every Judge on the bench shares, that text-books 
are more and more quoted in Court   I mean of course text- 
books by living authors   and some Judges have gone so Jar as to 
say that they shall not be quoted.'
Note that Kekewich re-stated the rule because 
barristers were ever more persistently breaking it. The 
convention appeared to be in retreat. Yet although, by the 
middle of the twentieth century, explicit judicial support 
for the convention against citation was diminishing, many 
judges continued to adhere to it. 'In the 1950s', Alan 
Paterson has claimed, 'barristers by and large seem to have 
felt unable to breach the non-citation rule in arguments 
before the Lords.' Recalling his days as a law student in the 
early 1960s, Peter Birks remarked that 'we still took in the 
message that it was only exceptionally that a living author 
might be cited in court, something which I accepted 
without question as part of the natural order'. Even as late 
as 1980   by which point appeal court judgments 
containing references to living authors were regularly 
being handed down   it is possible to find concern being 
expressed in the House of Lords over:
'the dangers, well perceived by our predecessors but tending to 
be neglected in modern times, of placing reliance on textbook 
authority for an analysis of judicial decisions' (Johnson v Agnew 
[1980] A.C. 367, 395, per Lord Wilberforce).
REASONS FOR THE CONVENTION
More interesting than the convention against citation
o o
itself are the reasons which might be offered in support of 
it. At least eight possible reasons might be identified.
First, the growth of law reporting after Blackstone's era 
and the resulting accessible store of common law 
principles ensured that it was no longer necessary to rely 
on textbooks for second-hand renderings of cases. 
Second, the declaratory theory of law   a theory which 
was subscribed to by many English judges certainly until 
the mid-twentieth century   seemed to preclude the 
possibility of treating textbooks as legal authorities. In 
1892, Lord Esher explained the declaratory theory thus:
'[tjhere is in fact no such thing as judge-made law, for the 
judges do not make the law, though they frequently have to apply 25
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existing law to circumstances as to which it has not previously 
been authoritatively laid down that such law is applicable. '
Acceptance of the declaratory theory appears to mean 
treating all extra-judicial opinion as not authoritative. For 
anyone who accepts the declaratory theory, the occasions 
on which any academic commentary might appropriately 
be cited in court are rare, since the jurist is little, if 
anything, more than a helpful expositor of the law.
FEAR OF CAUSING OFFENCE
A third possible reason for the convention against the 
citation of living authors is the fear of causing offence. A
o o
judge might oppose citation of the work of living jurist X 
in court out of a concern that such citation may offend 
other living jurists who consider their own opinions to be 
just as authoritative and relevant as those of X. Judges 
reduce opportunities for juristic Sturm und Drang where 
they condone the citation only of those commentators 
who are no longer alive: those who see their work passed 
over in silence can console themselves, after all, with the 
thought that they might have been treated differently were 
they dead.
Fourth, the convention may have been favoured in order 
to prevent or reduce judicial citation of immature or 
unreflective commentary. '[T]he passage of years and the 
activities of those who edit the books of the departed', R 
E Megarry has argued, 'tend to produce criticism and 
sometimes the elimination of frailties, and so give greater 
confidence in what remains.'
A fifth reason for the convention is that whereas the 
American style of judicial opinion-writing is conducive to 
inordinate citation, the English style pushes in the other 
direction. Being essentially an oral tradition, the English 
adjudicative process is less conducive to the more 
expansive citation practices found in some civil law 
countries and in the US.
A sixth possible reason for the convention concerns not 
so much how judges see academics but how academics 
have sometimes regarded themselves. Today, those who do 
not publish   whether through lack of drive, talent or 
confidence   are unlikely to survive in the law school 
environment, assuming they can secure an appointment in 
the first place. But it was not always thus. 'If academic 
lawyers are being honest', J W Bridge wrote in 1975, 'they 
will admit that there is still too little legal research being 
done.' Although legal academics 'have certainly progressed 
from being mere technicians', he concluded, they 'still do 
not advance their subject to the same degree as other 
academics advance theirs.'
History attests to this image of the academic lawyer as 
underachiever. '[T]he law school', wrote D. A. Winstanley 
in his Early Victorian Cambridge, 'was generally recognised to 
be a refuge for those who were averse to intellectual
o
effort.' The first chair of law in England, the Vineriano 7
chair, was not established until 1758. When, three quarters 
of a century later, a chair of English law was established at 
King's College London, its incumbent, I I Park revealed that
O O ' ' J J
members of the legal profession had urged him to decline 
the post on the basis that 'the office of a Law Professor was 
undesirable for a practising lawyer; for anyone, in short, but 
those who had nothing else to do.' Although there had been 
established in the 1870s faculties of law at Oxford and 
Cambridge, Albert Venn Dicey noted in his inaugural 
lecture at the former institution in 1883 that 'the non- 
existence till recent years of any legal professoriate' had 
ensured that there existed 'no history of English law as a 
whole deserving of the name'. In his inaugural lecture at 
Cambridge during the same year, Frederick Pollock sounded 
an even gloomier note: 'the scientific and systematic study 
of law,' he lamented, is 'a pursuit still followed in this land 
by few, scorned or deprecated by many.' Of course, the few 
who were following that pursuit   figures such as Anson, 
Bryce, Maine and Maitland (along, of course, with Dicey 
and Pollock themselves)   are now remembered as among 
the great English jurists. They constituted, however, a 
generation with few successors.
o
Academic law remained a fairly moribund, amateurish 
profession throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century. Never mind that judges were disinclined to allow 
citation of academic writings in court; academics, what 
few there were, were often disinclined to write. In his 
Presidential address to the Society of Public Teachers of 
Law (SPTL) in 1999, John Bell observed that neither of 
the two professors from his own institution who had 
previously served as SPTL Presidents would have been 
particularly preoccupied by research. 'Neither Professor 
Phillips (President 1914) nor Professor Hughes (President 
1931) wrote anything significant. For them, the subjects 
on which they wrote were hobbies, as much as fishing at 
his home in North Wales was for Professor Hughes.' 
'[OJutside one or two posts like the Vinerian 
professorship', wrote Harold Laski to Holmes in 1929, 
'the law teachers are a very inferior set of people who 
mainly teach because they cannot make a success of the 
bar' and who regard research 'as a merely professional by- 
product instead of being central to the profession and its 
organisation'. The English academic lawyer's tendency 
towards low self-esteem was noted by Laski four years 
earlier when, having attended a SPTL dinner, he observed 
that 'the judges who were the guests had, with two 
exceptions, a most amusing sense of infinite superiority,' 
while the academics exhibited 'a sense of complete 
inferiority.' Much the same observation is to be found in L 
C B Gower's inaugural lecture at the London School of 
Economics twenty-five years later:
'[NJothing is more nauseating than the patronising air of 
mock humility usually affected by one of His Majesty's judges 
when addressing an academic gathering. A psychiatrist will 
doubtless diagnose Jrom these remarks that I am suffering Jrom 
an inferiority complex. Precisely. It is my submission that English
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teachers of law sufferfrom an acute inferiority complex and that 
this is a bad thing for the profession as a whole.'
The status of law in the universities, and of university 
lawyers, until this point makes it hardly surprising that 
academic commentaries were rarely being cited in court. 
The academic-legal profession, in so far as there was such 
a profession, simply lacked presence. 'By the 1950s', 
Bridge observes, 'there were established law schools in the 
universities but [t]here was no widely established practice 
of legal research.' Little had changed by the middle of the 
following decade: Tulniversity law faculties', according to
o L J J J o
Abel-Smith and Stevens, 'still lacked prestige with other 
university faculties and with the profession. In general law 
departments were small and poorly equipped and had 
failed to attract a fair share of the best talent in the 
profession.'
Since the 1960s, nonetheless, the academic-legal 
profession has been developing rapidly. In 1974, the SPTL 
had just over 700 teaching members; in 1953 it had just 
over 200. Today, it has almost 2,500. Perhaps the English 
courts are nowadays more inclined to permit citations of, 
and indeed to cite, academic commentary because, like 
the legal academy itself, such commentary has become so 
much more of a presence; never before in England have 
there been so many academic lawyers producing so much 
specialist literature. Just as few barristers and judges 
would wish   let alone have the energy   to read all of this 
literature, one expects that few of them would be happy or 
even able to ignore it in its entirety. In the second half of 
the twentieth century, the academic-legal profession in 
England has not only grown significantly but has become 
much more organised, prolific, competitive, self-assured 
and able to provide practitioners, and to some extent 
judges also, with appropriate expertise and critical advice. 
It would be easy to treat the convention against citation as 
illustrative of nothing other than judicial philistinism; yet 
the history of English academic law, particularly during the 
first half of the twentieth century, forces us to confront the 
question why judges might ever have cared or been 
expected to take advice from a profession which was so 
underdeveloped and lacking in self-confidence.
The seventh reason for the convention against citation
o
is, in essence, that academic commentators are exempt 
from stare decisis. If commentary is recognised too hastily 
as work of authority, there is a risk that the author will 
change his or her mind and so render the source of law 
uncertain. An American legal historian, Borris Komar, 
explains the judicial predicament thus:
'[A] work cannot be a better authority than its writer. Suppose 
the latter has changed his mind upon some points. What, then, 
are we to take as authority   the opinion expressed in a work or 
the later one of its author? What is the position of the judge 
upon whom a living authority is pressed? He, a judge, must base 
his opinion as a rule upon an authority, but a living person 
often not in a judicial situation need not.'
This particular argument seems to require that one makes 
a fuss about next to nothing. Where an author changes his
o o
or her mind on a point of law, this may simply indicate that 
the judge who accepted the author's original position had, 
like the author, made a mistake. An author's change of 
mind will sometimes follow a change of law, and so will 
suggest not that the judge has made a mistake but that the 
law has moved on since the time of the decision. On 
occasion, it might even be the case that it is the change of7 o o
mind that represents the mistake and that the judge, having 
accepted the author's original argument, continues to 
subscribe to the more compelling point of view. Whatever 
the scenario, the argument that the integrity of the judicial 
process might somehow be put at risk when judges rely on 
viewpoints which may change seems rather feeble.
THE MOST INTERESTING REASON
The eighth reason for the convention is perhaps the most 
interesting reason. It might be summarized thus: judges 
ought to be wary of relying on the works of living 
commentators   indeed, it is unrealistic to believe that 
such commentators can be of much assistance to judges   
because the two groups inhabit distinct legal worlds and are 
engaged in very different enterprises. If taken to its logical 
conclusion this argument cautions against the admission of 
any academic commentary into court, whether the 
commentator be alive or dead. Megarry puts forth the 
argument in his Hamlyn lectures of 1962. Rejecting the 
proposal that some academic lawyers might, like practising 
barristers, be appointed as judges, Megarry argues that 
whereas the barrister spends 'much of his life in the law 
among the facts [t]he academic lawyer escapes all this.'
'When an experienced advocate becomes a judge, he has 
experienced so much advocacy that he has it in his bones to make 
suitable discounts, to detect and check any undesirable practices, 
and to come as close to the truth as is likely to be possible Jor 
any human tribunal. The admission in cross-examination that 
was obtained in reply to a loaded question, the answer that was 
begotten of confusion rather than confession, the moment of 
truth, all these he has learned to recognise and evaluate: of all of 
these, and a mass of practical and procedural detail, the 
academic lawyer is innocent.'
To be a trial judge demands a certain nous which comes 
from experience in the trenches. Academic lawyers never 
obtain the experience and so lack the nous. In short, they 
are likely to be too ponderous, leisurely, genteel, 
impractical and unworldly to be able to carry out the work 
of a judge. In Cordell v Second Clanfield Properties ([1969] 2 
Ch. 9), Megarry J   by this point elevated to the bench   
adapts his general line of argument in order to explain why 
judges ought to be circumspect when relying on the 
opinions of commentators:
'The process of authorship is entirely different from that of 
judicial decision. The author, no doubt, has the benefit of a 
broad and comprehensive survey of his chosen subject as a whole,
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together with a lengthy period of gestation, and intermittent 
opportunitiesJbr reconsideration. But he is exposed to the peril of 
yielding to preconceptions, and he lacks the advantage of that 
impact and sharpening cffocus which the detailed facts of a 
particular case bring to the judge. Above all, he has tojbrm his 
ideas without the purifying ordeal of skilled argument on the 
specific facts of a contested case. Argued law is tough law. This is 
as true today as it was in 1409 when Hankford J. said: "Home 
ne scaveroit de quel metal une campanejuit, si ceo nefuit batu, 
quasi diceret, le ley per ban disputation serra bien conus" [Just 
as a man would not know the quality of a bell without ringing it 
thoroughly, so too it is said that by good disputing shall the law 
be well known] (Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, Mich.,Jo. 37); and these 
words are none the less apt for a judge who sits, as I do, within 
earshot of the bells of St. Clements. I would, therefore, give credit 
to the words of any reputable author in book or article as 
expressing tenable and arguable ideas, as fertilizers of thought, 
and as conveniently expressing the fruits of research in print, 
often in apt and persuasive language. But I would do no more 
than that; and in particular I would expose those views to the 
testing and refining process of argument.'
JURISTIC REASONING IS DIFFERENT 
FROM JUDICIAL REASONING
Juristic reasoning is different from, and invariably 
inferior to, judicial reasoning because it is insufficiently 
honed through disputation. Citation of academic 
commentary in court ought to arouse judicial suspicion   
so the argument goes   because it tends to come wrapped 
in cotton wool, rarely if ever having been subjected to 
robust scrutiny. Just as academic lawyers themselves are 
likely to be temperamentally unsuited to judicial tasks, 
many of their arguments and theories will be too fragile 
for the real world of the court-room.
Megarry was probably quite right to claim that neither 
academics nor their arguments would often have made a
favourable impression in court; he was writing, after all, 
during that period when the academic legal profession was 
still nascent and somewhat complacent. The objective 
here is not to dispute his claim, or, for that matter, the 
arguments of anyone else who expresses misgivings about 
academics and legal commentary finding their way into 
the court-room. What concerns us is the signal which this 
general line of reasoning sends out. If one reflects upon 
the convention against citation, and upon the reasons 
adduced to explain that convention, what impression of 
academic lawyers is one likely to form? The answer seems 
to be: that they are, variously, delicate plants, loose 
cannons, an uncharismatic and whimsical bunch, unable 
to be trusted not to change their minds on points of law 
and unlikely to be able to perform the role of a judge; that 
they are sometimes too ponderous, at other times too 
expeditious, in articulating legal opinions; that they have 
the easy life of the armchair critic, under no pressure to 
provide solutions quickly and accountable to no-one
should their solutions prove wrongheaded; that their workr o 7
ideally ought not to be treated as secondary authority, or, 
if it is to be treated thus, must be used with 
circumspection; and that their influence on counsel, 
should they ever have any, ought to be deemed 
undeserving of acknowledgement. Small wonder that 
English academic lawyers in the past have seemed 
somewhat attention-starved and blighted by a sense of 
inferiority. @
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